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Abstract
This research explores the direct and barrier effects of culture on economic development. It
shows both theoretically and empirically that whenever the technological frontier is at the top
or bottom of the world distribution of a cultural value, there exists an observational equivalence
between absolute cultural distances and cultural distances relative to the frontier, preventing the
identification of its direct and barrier effects. Since the technological frontier usually has the “right”
cultural values for development, it tends to be in the extremes of the distribution of cultural traits,
generating observational equivalence and confounding the analysis. These results highlight the
difficulty of disentangling the direct and barrier effects of culture. The empirical analysis finds
suggestive evidence for direct effects of individualism and conformity with hierarchy, and barrier
effects of hedonism.
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1 Introduction
Economists have been studying the effects of culture on economic development at least since Weber
(1930) proposed his famous “protestant ethic” thesis, which posited that protestantism was conducive
to capitalist development due to its emphasis on thrift, hard work, and human capital accumulation
(Andersen et al., 2013; Becker and Woessmann, 2009). Additional cultural determinants of com-
parative development have been suggested in the literature, including differences in levels of trust,
cooperation, family ties, individualism, obedience, and attitudes towards work and other individuals
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2010, 2014; Giuliano, 2007; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2016; Guiso et al.,
2006, 2009; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001).
This literature has focused mainly on the direct effects of culture on development, i.e. how having
a certain absolute level of a cultural trait affects economic development. Thus, for example, analyzing
whether being more or less patient affects development through its impact on human and physical
capital accumulation (Dohmen et al., 2015; Galor and O¨zak, 2016). On the other hand, a more recent
strand of the literature has emphasized a potential barrier effect of culture on development, i.e. how
relative levels of a cultural trait affect economic development (Basso and Cuberes, 2016; Guiso et al.,
2009; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). In particular, cultural differences relative to the technological
frontier, like not sharing its religion or language, might act as cultural barriers to technological diffusion
and thus lower economic development (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2012, 2013).
These two types of effects of culture have been identified largely by exploring the differential effects
of absolute and relative cultural distances in pairwise country regressions. In particular, if absolute
differences in a cultural trait between countries are significantly associated with absolute differences in
development then, it is argued, culture has a direct effect. On the other hand, if differences between
countries in a cultural trait relative to the technological frontier are significantly associated with
absolute differences in development then, it is argued, culture has a barrier effect. The literature has
focused on addressing potential threats to identification like reverse causality and omitted variable
bias, but it has failed to recognize the problem of observational equivalence between absolute and
relative cultural distances, i.e., conditions when these cultural distances are indistinguishable from
each other.
This paper identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for observational equivalence in a
cultural trait to hold. In particular, it establishes that observational equivalence holds in a cultural
trait if, and only if, the technological frontier is at the top or at the bottom of the global distribution
of this cultural trait. Thus, the problem of observational equivalence is created by the location of the
technological frontier in the global distribution of cultural values. Importantly, since the technological
frontier usually has the “right” cultural values for development, it tends to be in the extremes of the
distribution of cultural traits, hence generating observational equivalence and confounding the analysis.
While the perfect multicollinearity behind observational equivalence may not hold perfectly, large
correlations between absolute and relative cultural distances may still prevent the correct identification
of these effects.
The observational equivalence of absolute and relative cultural distances could play an important
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role in the identification, understanding and implications of the direct and barrier effects of culture.
In particular, since these effects might generate completely different policy recommendations it seems
important to further understand and disentangle these cultural mechanisms. Interestingly, this ob-
servational equivalence and the issues it raises have not been previously identified in the literature.
Partly, this omission may be due to the use of genetic distances to proxy for cultural differences.
For example, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) have shown that differences in contemporary income per
capita are associated with relative genetic distances to the United States, thus suggesting a barrier
effect of culture. A major drawback of this approach is that it does not identify the cultural values
behind these associations and, as will be apparent below, it may be confounding the true channel
through which culture affects development.
This research advances the understanding of the relation between differences in contemporary in-
come per capita levels and cultural differences between countries and their cultural differences relative
to the contemporary technological frontier, i.e. the United States. It establishes that absolute differ-
ences in levels of individualism and vertical hierarchy across countries are statistically and economically
significantly associated with differences in contemporary income per capita.1 On the other hand, lin-
guistic distances and differences in hedonism are the only cultural differences relative to the United
States that are statistically and economically significantly associated with differences in contemporary
income. Moreover, once these cultural traits are accounted for, genetic distances relative to the US
cease to be robustly associated with development. In particular, genetic distances are not significant
when differences in individualism are accounted for. Thus, suggesting that the use of genetic distances
as proxies for cultural differences may hide the observational equivalence problem and misrepresent
the true effects of culture.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 studies the problem of observational
equivalence in a general theoretical setting and identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for
its presence. Section 3 explores the problem of observational equivalence empirically. Specifically, it
introduces the data and presents the main empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Observational Equivalence in Theory
This section shows the problem of observational equivalence in the study of the relation between
cultural differences and economic development. In particular, it establishes the necessary and sufficient
conditions for observational equivalence to hold.2 Moreover, it shows that whenever observational
equivalence holds, an empirical researcher may draw wrong conclusions about the effect of culture.
Assume income per capita in country i in a balanced growth path depends monotonically on two
cultural traits, θi ∈ [θ, θ¯] and σi ∈ [σ, σ¯]. Specifically, assume that income per capita in country i is
1Individualism has also been linked to the timing of the fertility transition (Basso and Cuberes, 2016).
2The analysis focuses on observational equivalence in pairwise regressions, but it is easy to show using the same type
of arguments that the similar necessary and sufficient conditions are required for observational equivalence to hold in
country-level regressions.
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given by
yi =h(θi, |σi − σf |), (1)
where σf is the level of σ in the technological frontier f . Without loss of generality assume that h
is strictly increasing in the first component and strictly decreasing in the second component. These
assumptions capture the idea that θ has only a direct effect on development, while σ only has a barrier
effect on development.
Given a cultural value θ, let θij denote the absolute cultural distance in θ between countries i and
j and θRij denote their relative cultural distance to the frontier in θ. Thus,
θij = |θi − θj | , θRij = |θif − θjf | . (2)
Similarly, let σij denote the absolute cultural distance in σ between countries i and j and σ
R
ij denote
their relative cultural distance in σ. Thus, one can rewrite income per capita as yi = h(θi, σif ), which
highlights the different effects these two cultural traits have. Let N = {1, . . . , Nc} denote the set of
countries.
Definition 2.1. Given a cultural trait c, observational equivalence in cultural trait c holds whenever
cij = c
R
ij for all i, j ∈ N .3
Theorem 2.2. Observational equivalence in cultural trait c holds if, and only if, the technological
frontier f is at the top or bottom of the distribution of c, i.e., if cf ≤ ci for all i ∈ N or cf ≥ ci for
all i ∈ N .
Proof. First, let’s prove that if cf ≥ ci for all i ∈ N , then observational equivalence holds. In particular,
by definition
cRij = |cif − cjf | ,
but by assumption
cif = |ci − cf | = −(ci − cf ).
Thus,
cRij = |−(ci − cf )− [−(cj − cf )]| = |cj − ci| = cij .
The proof for the case when cf ≤ ci for all i ∈ N is similar. Thus, if the technological frontier is at
the top or bottom of the distribution of c, then observational equivalence in c holds.
To prove the converse, assume observational equivalence holds and for some pair of countries i, j,
ci < cf < cj . Then,
cij = |ci − cj | = −(ci − cj) = cj − ci, cif = |ci − cf | = cf − ci, cjf = |cj − cf | = cj − cf ,
3Given the literature’s emphasis on pairwise regressions, the analysis focuses on observational equivalence in this
setting. It is not difficult to see that similar problems arise in country-level analyses.
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so that
cRij = ||ci − cf | − |cj − cf || = |2cf − (ci + cj)| .
Since observational equivalence holds, it must be that
cij = cj − ci = |2cf − (ci + cj)| .
This implies that if 2cf − (ci + cj) > 0, then
cj − ci = 2cf − (ci + cj) ⇐⇒ cj = cf ,
which is a contradiction. Similarly, if 2cf − (ci + cj) < 0, then
cj − ci = (ci + cj)− 2cf ⇐⇒ ci = cf ,
which again is a contradiction. Thus, if observational equivalence holds, either cf ≥ ci for all i ∈ N
or cf ≤ ci for all i ∈ N .
To see the problems caused by observational equivalence, consider first the case when income per
capita is only a function of θ, and thus culture only has direct effects on development. In this case,
yi = h(θi), so that the income per capita difference between countries i and j is
yij = |yi − yj | =
∣∣∣h′(θ˜)∣∣∣ |θi − θj |+ ηij = ∣∣∣h′(θ˜)∣∣∣ θij + ηij (3)
for some θ˜ ∈ [θ, θ¯], where ηij is the residual in the expansion. This suggests that the structural
equation for this case should be of the form
yij = α+ βθθij + ij . (4)
But, if observational equivalence in θ holds, then θij = θ
R
ij and a researcher who does not know the
true model of the economy may erroneously estimate the following model
yij = α+ β
R
θ θ
R
ij + ij . (5)
While in this case the estimate of βRθ would be a good estimate of the true structural parameter βθ,
its interpretation, and any policy recommendation based on it, would be wrong, since they would be
based on the assumption of a barrier effect of culture. Moreover, notice that the researcher cannot
identify the true effect by estimating
yij = α+ βθθij + β
R
θ θ
R
ij + ij , (6)
since θij and θ
R
ij are perfectly correlated. Thus, only βθ + β
R
θ is identified, but the individual values
are not. Similarly, if income per capita is only a function of σ, so that culture only has barrier effects,
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then yi = h(σif ) and
|yi − yj | =
∣∣h′(σ˜)∣∣σRij + ηRij (7)
for some σ˜ ∈ [σ, σ¯], where ηRij is the residual in the expansion. This would suggest a structural equation
of the form
yij = α+ β
R
σ σ
R
ij + ij . (8)
Again, if observational equivalence in σ holds, then σRij = σij and a researcher who does not know the
true model of the economy may erroneously estimate the following model
yij = α+ βσσij + ij . (9)
As before, the estimate of βσ would be a good estimate of the true structural parameter β
R
σ , but
its interpretation, and any policy recommendation based on it, would be wrong, since they would be
based on the assumption of a direct effect of culture. Moreover, as before, the true effect cannot be
identified by estimating
yij = α+ βσσij + β
R
σ σ
R
ij + ij , (10)
since σij and σ
R
ij are perfectly correlated. Thus, only βσ + β
R
σ is identified, but the individual values
are not. Clearly, in the general case, when culture has both direct and barrier effects the structural
equation would be of the form
yij = α+ βθθij + β
R
σ σ
R
ij + ij . (11)
If observational equivalence in both θ and σ hold, then a researcher may erroneously estimate any of
the following equations
yij =α+ βθθij + βσσij + ij , yij =α+ β
R
θ θ
R
ij + βσσij + ij , yij =α+ β
R
θ θ
R
ij + β
R
σ σ
R
ij + ij . (12)
As before, the estimated coefficients would provide correct estimates of the underlying parameters,
but their interpretation would be wrong. Moreover, including both the absolute and relative distances
cannot help identify the individual parameters.
Note that given a set of Nc countries, where a share λc ∈ [0, 1] has a value of the cultural trait
ci ≥ cf , then observational equivalence in c holds for a share
ωc =
[
λ2c + (1− λc)2
]
Nc − 1
Nc − 1 (13)
of the sample of all country pairs. Clearly, ωc ≥ (Nc − 2)(2Nc − 2) ≈ 0.5 for large Nc, which suggests
observational equivalence may be affecting the estimation and interpretation of results even in cases
where observational equivalence does not hold for the full sample. Moreover, the closer λc is to 0
or 1, the larger are ωc and the correlation between cij and c
R
ij , which increases the possibility of
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multicollinearity in the analysis.
3 Observational Equivalence in Praxis
This section explores empirically the relation between absolute and relative cultural distances and
identifies the cases of observational equivalence, when the direct and barrier effect of culture are
indistinguishable. Whenever there is no observational equivalence, it attempts to disentangle the
direct effect and barrier effects of culture on development.
The research analyzes the effect of culture using six Cultural Dimensions from Hofstede et al.
(2010): (i) Power Distance (PDI), which measures the extent to which the less powerful members of
society accept and expect power to be unequally distributed; (ii) Individualism vs. Collectivism (IDV),
which measures the degree to which individuals are expected to fend for themselves; (iii) Competition
vs. Cooperation (CVC), which refers to levels of cooperation and competition among members of
society; (iv) Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI), which measures the extent to which members of a culture
feel threatened by ambiguous and unknown situations; (v) Long-Term Orientation (LTO), which
measures the extent to which a culture fosters virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular
perseverance and thrift; (vi) Indulgence vs. Restraint (IVR), which measures the extent to which a
culture allows enjoying life and having fun through free gratification of human drives or suppresses
them through strict social norms.4
For each cultural dimension two distance measures are constructed for each country pair. In
particular, given a cultural trait θ, the absolute pairwise distance between countries i and j, θij , is given
by θij = |θi − θj |, and the relative pairwise distance to the contemporary technological frontier between
countries i and j, θRij , is given by θ
R
ij = |θiUS − θjUS |, where it is assumed that the contemporary
technological frontier is the US, and θiUS is the absolute distance between country i and the US.
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the six cultural measures. In particular, each panel shows
the distribution of a cultural measure, the location of the US in the distribution, the identity of
the countries with the highest and lowest levels of the cultural value, as well as the location of the
median and the interquartile range. Additionally, for each cultural value it shows the correlation
between the absolute and relative cultural distances between countries in the full sample of country
pairs. As shown in section 2, if the technological frontier is at the top or bottom of the distribution,
the correlation between absolute and relative cultural distances is 1, as in the case of Individualism.
While the case of Individualism is extreme, notice that the US is always outside the interquartile
range and the correlation between absolute and relative cultural distances is larger than 0.58, which
should be expected since the technological frontier is bound to have “good” cultural values. Thus,
as established in Table 1, observational equivalence is present in over 62% of the sample of country
pairs. Interestingly, even if the subsample where observational equivalence is present is removed, the
correlation between absolute and relative cultural distances remains above 0.47.
The analysis explores the direct and barrier effects of culture on development using a generalization
4The empirical analysis uses all six Hofstede cultural dimensions for the sample of countries for which all measures
are available.
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Figure 1: Location of U.S. in the Distribution of Hofstede Dimensions
of the empirical specification in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), which includes absolute and relative
cultural differences, namely
yij =α+ βθθij + β
R
θ θ
R
ij + βGGDij + β
R
GGD
R
ij + βLLDij + β
R
LLD
R
ij + βRRDij + β
R
RRD
R
ij (14)
+
∑
k
γkX
k
ij + ci + cj + ij ,
where the dependent variable, yij , is the absolute value of the pairwise difference in log income per
capita in 1995 between country i and j, θij and θ
R
ij are their absolute and relative differences in one
of the cultural values defined above, GDij is their genetic distance, GD
R
ij is their relative genetic
distance to the US, LDij is their linguistic distance, LD
R
ij is their relative linguistic distance, RDij
is their religious distance, RDRij is their relative religious distance,
{
Xkij
}
k
is a large set of additional
pairwise controls, including geographic distances and differences in geographic factors (absolute lati-
tude, landlocked, island, close to coast or river, terrain ruggedness, agricultural and caloric suitability,
climatic zones, etc.), common history (ever same country, ever in colonial relationship, have common
colonizer), a complete set of continental fixed effects (whether one, both or none of the countries in
the pair belong to a specific continent), ci and cj are country fixed effects, and ij is an error term.
5
Given that the construction of differences can potentially generate correlation across observations for
each country i, the analysis clusters standard errors at two levels, one for each country in the pair
(Cameron et al., 2011; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009).
5Given space constraints, the results shown in the main body of the paper use only this set of controls and cultural
measures. Reassuringly, inclusion of a larger set of controls and expansion of the analysis to additional measures of
culture based on the World Values Survey does not affect the results (Harutyunyan and O¨zak, 2016).
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Table 1: Observational Equivalence in Subsamples
Subsample of Country Pairs for which Cultural Value in US is
Higher/Lower than Values in Both Between Values in Both
Correlation Observations Share Correlation Observations Share
Individualism 1.00*** 1,830 1.00 NA 0 0.00
Power Distance 1.00*** 1,206 0.66 0.58*** 624 0.34
Competition/Cooperation 1.00*** 1,140 0.62 0.58*** 690 0.38
Uncertainly Avoidance 1.00*** 1,280 0.70 0.50*** 550 0.30
Long-Term Orientation 1.00*** 1,280 0.70 0.88*** 550 0.30
Indulgence/Restraint 1.00*** 1,242 0.68 0.47*** 588 0.32
Notes: This table explores the strength of observational equivalence for various cultural traits. It shows the correlation
between absolute and relative cultural distances for the subsamples of country pairs for which the cultural value in the US
is either higher or lower than the values in both countries in the pair or the value in the US is between the values of the
country pair. Observational equivalence holds in the first subsample (by definition), so its share provides a measure of the
problem. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided
hypothesis tests.
Table 2 explores the partial correlation between differences in economic development, relative
genetic distances and cultural distances. Column 1 shows that genetic distance relative to frontier
is significantly associated with income differences for the subset of countries for which the cultural
values are available. Columns 2-7 account for absolute cultural distances, while columns 9-14 account
for relative distances to the US for these cultural values. The results suggest that Individualism and
Power Distance have direct effects on economic development, while Individualism and Indulgence vs
Restraint have barrier effects on development. Columns 8 and 15 respectively account for all absolute
and relative cultural distances jointly with similar results.
The results of columns 2 and 9 establish that once one accounts for differences in Individualism, the
genetic distance relative to the US ceases to be associated with differences in economic development.
This suggests that genetic distances relative to the US might be capturing the effect of differences in
Individualism. This view is supported by Harutyunyan and O¨zak (2016), which established the strong
association between genetic distances and differences in Individualism. Furthermore, they also show
that relative distances in Individualism are the only relative cultural trait that is economically and
statistically significantly correlated with relative genetic distances.
While these results suggest that relative genetic distances might be capturing the barrier effect
of Individualism, this interpretation is subject to the problem of observational equivalence. In par-
ticular, given that the US has the highest value of Individualism (see Figure 1(a)), the absolute and
relative distances are observationally equivalent. Indeed, the estimated effect of absolute and relative
differences in Individualism is identical in columns 2 and 9. So, although column 9 would suggest a
barrier effect of individualism, this might just be capturing its direct effect that has been obscured
by observational equivalence. Moreover, in light of this observational equivalence and the findings of
Harutyunyan and O¨zak (2016), it is possible that relative genetic distances do not capture the barrier
effect, but instead the direct effects of culture.
Although these results suggest one potential mechanism being captured by relative genetic dis-
tances, it does not help in the identification of the direct vs barrier effects of these various cultural
values. In order to analyze this further, Table 3 accounts jointly for both absolute and relative cultural
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distances. Given the potential bias due to omitted variables, it additionally accounts for geographical
differences, pairwise continental fixed effects, other measures of common ancestry, as well as relative
linguistic and religious distances, and country fixed effects. Column 2 shows that differences in Indi-
vidualism remain strongly associated with differences in economic development. However, since the
absolute and relative distances in Individualism are perfectly correlated, the empirical specification
does not allow to disentangle the direct and barrier effect of individualism. Indeed, the coefficient on
the relative distance in Individualism is 0. Columns 3 and 7 show that the absolute distance in Power
Distance and the relative distance in Indulgence vs Restraint are positive economically statistically
significantly associated with differences in economic development. These results suggest that Power
Distance has a direct effect on economic development, while Indulgence vs Restraint has a barrier
effect on development. Finally, Column 8 establishes that similar results hold if the analysis accounts
jointly for all cultural differences.
These results suggest that (i) genetic distances relative to the US might be capturing the (direct
or barrier) effects of Individualism, (ii) Individualism may have either direct or barrier effects, (iii)
Power Distance has significant direct effects, and (iv) Indulgence vs Restraint has significant barrier
effects on economic development. While these results suggest the presence of various direct effects,
the existence of observational equivalence between absolute and relative distances calls for caution
in the interpretation. In particular, although observational equivalence holds only in the case of
Individualism, the correlation between absolute and relative distances is high for both Power Distance
and Indulgence vs Restraint, increasing the potential for a misidentification of the effects of culture.
One potential strategy to address the problem raised by observational equivalence is to analyze the
effect of culture only in the subsample where observational equivalence is not present, i.e., by excluding
all country pairs for which the cultural value in the US is higher or lower than in both countries in the
pair. While this strategy may address the problem of observational equivalence, it may generate other
biases due to (non-random) sampling, the exclusion of information, and the reduction in the sample
size. Moreover, as Table 1 shows, while this strategy implies the loss of about 2/3 of the sample, it
does not eliminate the correlation between absolute and relative cultural distances. In non-reported
results, following this strategy the analysis finds further suggestive evidence in favor of a barrier effect
of Indulgence vs. Restraint, but finds no significant direct nor barrier effects for any of the other
cultural values, suggesting that there may exist significant biases in this subsample.
4 Conclusion
This research explores the direct and barrier effects of culture on economic development. It shows
both theoretically and empirically that whenever the technological frontier is at the top or bottom of
the world distribution of a cultural value, there exists an observational equivalence between absolute
and relative distances, preventing the identification of direct and barrier effects of this cultural value.
More specifically, the analysis establishes that observational equivalence holds in a cultural trait if,
and only if, the technological frontier is at the top or at the bottom of the global distribution of
this cultural trait. So, given that the technological frontier usually has the “right” cultural values
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Table 3: Hofstede Cultural Dimensions and Income (All Controls)
Differences in log per capita income (1995)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Genetic Distance 0.17 0.18 0.21** 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.20*
Relative to US (0.16) (0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.12)
Individualism 0.28*** 0.19**
(0.08) (0.08)
Power Distance 0.42*** 0.25***
(0.09) (0.09)
Competition/Cooperation 0.03 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Uncertainty Avoidance 0.09 0.07
(0.07) (0.06)
Long-Term Orientation -0.08 -0.06
(0.11) (0.10)
Indulgence/Restraint -0.10 -0.03
(0.07) (0.07)
Individualism, 0.00 0.00
Relative to US (0.00) (0.00)
Power Distance, -0.13 -0.07
Relative to US (0.09) (0.08)
Competition/Cooperation, -0.03 0.00
Relative to US (0.04) (0.04)
Uncertainty Avoidance, -0.04 -0.09*
Relative to US (0.05) (0.05)
Long-Term Orientation, 0.04 0.01
Relative to US (0.09) (0.10)
Indulgence/Restraint, 0.32*** 0.20**
Relative to US (0.10) (0.09)
Genetic Distance -0.14 -0.23 -0.24* -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.28*
(0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
Linguistic Distance 0.14* 0.07 0.05 0.14* 0.13 0.15* 0.15* 0.06
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Religious Distance -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Linguistic Distance 0.16** 0.08 0.10 0.17** 0.17** 0.17** 0.08 0.00
Relative to the US (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Religious Distance 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.07
Relative to the US (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geo Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.50 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.60
Observations 1596 1596 1596 1596 1596 1596 1596 1596
Notes: This table explores the direct and barrier effects of Hofstede’s cultural values by running a horse race between absolute and
relative cultural distances, including linguistic and religious distances. Coefficients are standardized betas of an Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression after accounting for country fixed effects, geographical differences, pairwise continental fixed effects.
Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and *
at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
for development, it will tend to be in the extremes of the distribution of cultural traits and generate
observational equivalence. Thus, these results highlight the difficulty of disentangling the direct and
barrier effects of culture.
The analysis suggests that Individualism and Power Distance have direct effects on development,
while Indulgence vs. Restraint has barrier effects. Still, the problem of observational equivalence
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suggests these effects may be misidentified. In particular, given that the United States is the most
individualistic country in the sample, differences in individualism and differences in individualism
relative to the US are perfectly correlated. Thus, it is not possible to disentangle the direct and barrier
effects in this case as they are observationally equivalent. Moreover, while the case of Individualism is
extreme, the correlation between absolute and relative cultural distances is generally high. Also, even
when observational equivalence does not hold empirically for the full sample, it does hold for a large
subsample of the data.
Since the barrier effect has been studied using relative genetic distances as a proxy for relative
cultural distances, the observational equivalence of absolute and relative cultural distances has not
been previously identified in the literature. Specifically, since absolute and relative genetic distances
are strongly associated with absolute and relative cultural differences (Harutyunyan and O¨zak, 2016),
the observational equivalence of these cultural channels has remained obscured. Importantly, this
observational equivalence plays an essential role in the identification and understanding of the direct
and barrier effects of culture. Moreover, since these effects may generate completely different policy
recommendations it seems important to further understand and disentangle the cultural mechanisms
behind each.
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